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"Let's Change the Law": Arkansas and the
Puzzle of Juvenile Justice Reform in the
1990s
DAVID S. TANENHAUS AND ERIC C. NYSTROM
[Governor Tucker] should also propose that juveniles be charged
as adults more often. Such laws sound harsh. They are. Right
now, they need to be. This is known as protecting the public safe-
ty. As deterrence. Until that improbable day when social scientists
pinpoint the cause of crime, punishment is the best answer. Sure,
swift punishment. Word will get around.
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 10, 1994.
On March 20, 2012, during the oral argument in Miller v. Alabama,.
Associate Justice Samuel Alito pressed the petitioner's counsel Bryan
Stevenson to explain his contention that state legislators did not understand
the sentencing consequences of the juvenile transfer laws that they had
passed during the 1990s.1 These laws facilitated the transfer of children's
1. Miller v. Alabama, 2012, 13-14. http://www.supremecourt.gov/oml_arguments/argument
transcripts/10-9646.pdf (May 28, 2015). In the petition for writ of certiorari, filed on March
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cases from juvenile court into an adult criminal justice system that required
mandatory sentences, such as life without the possibility of parole, for
many offenses. 2 The Supreme Court had consolidated the cases of
Kuntrell Jackson, an African American teenager, who had been convicted
of capital murder in Arkansas, and Evan Miller, a white teenager who had
been convicted of murder in an arson case in Alabama. Kuntrell and Evan
had both been 14 years old at the time of their crimes, and in both cases,
the minimum and maximum sentences were exactly the same: life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP). The prosecutor in Miller's case had ar-
gued that the teenager deserved to die for his crime but that the Supreme
Court had abolished the juvenile death penalty in 2005.3 Five years later,
the high court banned LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of nonho-
micidal offenses.4 Now Stevenson, the Executive Director of the Equal
Justice Initiative, urged the justices to use the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments to eliminate all mandatory LWOP sen-
tences for minors.5
Alito challenged Stevenson's premise that state legislators did not know
what they had done. "You mean," Alito stated, "the legislatures have en-
acted these laws, but they don't realize that, under these laws, a-person
21, 2011, Stevenson had asserted that "in most states where children fourteen and younger have
been sentenced to life without parole, the legislatures have never expressly authorized life with-
outparole sentences for young children; such sentences are a byproduct of legislation expanding
the susceptibility ofjuveniles to adult prosecution (p. 3)." For an overview ofjuvenile without
life parole sentencing, see Ashley Nellis, A Return to Justice: Rethinking Our Approach to
Juveniles in the System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 59-60.
2. Between 1990 and 1996, the District of Columbia and forty states passed laws to make
it easier to prosecute minors in adult court. Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, eds. The
Changing Borders ofJuvenile Justice: Transfer ofAdolescents to Criminal Court (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 2; Patricia Torbet, Richard Gable, Hunter Hurst IV,
Imogene Montgomery, Linda Szymanski, and Douglas Thomas, States Responses to Serious
and Violent Juvenile Crime: Research Report. (Washington, DC: National Center for
Juvenile Justice, 1996); Shay Bilchik, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States:
1994-1996 (Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
1997); and Patrick Griffin, Patricia Torbet, and Linda Szymanski, Trying Juveniles in
Adult Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions (Washington, DC: Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, United States
Department of Justice, 1998). By 1996, every state had also passed some version of manda-
tory sentencing. Marc Mauer, "The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the
United States," in Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences, ed. David
Garland (London: Sage Publications; 2001), 6.
3. Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy: A Story ofJustice and Redemption (New York: Spiegel
& Grau, 2014), 265; and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. Graham v. Florida, 510 U.S. (2010).
5. Stevenson, Just Mercy, 256-274.
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under the age of 18 may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole
for-for murder. They don't understand that?" In response, Stevenson clar-
ified his argument: "They-they have not considered that or adopted or en-
dorsed it, would be accurate." Alito responded, "If you think these
legislators don't understand what their laws provide, why don't you contact
them? And when they-when you tell them, do you realize that in your
State a-a 16-year-old or a 17-year-old may be sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole for murder, they'll say: Oh, my gosh, I never realized
that; let's change the law." 6
As it turned out, Stevenson did not have to contact state legislators in
multiple states because the Roberts Court used Miller v. Alabama to ban
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.7 However, Alito's
question about legislative understanding remained unanswered. Scholars
of juvenile justice, in fact, are still seeking to explain the legislative frenzy
of transfer laws in the 1990s.8 And a comprehensive legal history of state-
level juvenile justice lawmaking during the late twentieth century remains
unwritten.9
How do you systematically study a national history that was the product
of lawmaking in fifty separate jurisdictions? This "fifty-state problem,"
compounded by the sheer quantity of juvenile justice laws enacted during
the 1990s, suggested why digital tools could help. 10 Historians, we be-
lieved, could use computing power to search for interconnections among
these many laws. Accordingly, we created a database of all the state session
laws from all fifty states (1990-2001) and built digital tools to help us see
legislative patterns over time and across space. Our custom search engine
6. Miller v. Alabama, 2012, 14-15 (June 2, 1015).
7. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. (2012). The Court recently held that this holding is retroactive.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. (2015). Justice Alito still rejects these holdings. See Mark
Joseph Stem, "Sore Losers: Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas are Still Trying to Keep Juvenile
Offenders Behind Bars for Life," Slate, May 23, 2016. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/samuel alito and clarencethomasaresore losers.htmI
(June 17, 2016).
8. Franklin E. Zimring, "The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer in the 1990s," in
Choosing the Future for American Juvenile Justice, ed. Franklin E. Zimring and David
S. Tanenhaus (New York: NYU Press, 2014), 45.
9. For an illuminating case study of juvenile justice lawmaking in Pennsylvania and
Washington State during this period, see Michael B. Schlossman and Brandon C. Welsh,
"Searching for the Best Mix of Strategies: Delinquency Prevention and the
Transformation of Juvenile Justice in the 'Get Tough' Era and Beyond," Social Service
Review 89 (2015): 622-52.
10. Our conservative estimate is that the fifty states passed between 1,000 and 1,500 ju-
venile justice laws during the 1990s, Eric C. Nystrom and David S. Tanenhaus, "The Future
of Digital Legal History: No Magic, No Silver Bullets," American Journal ofLegal History
56 (2016): 150-67.
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helped us explore the language of the session laws and to look for terms
indicative of important juvenile justice concerns, such as the transfer of
children into the criminal justice system. From 68 GB of downloaded
PDFs, we extracted text from parts of session laws relevant to juvenile jus-
tice, ending up with more than 17,000 of these fragments. We compared all
of them to each other, using algorithms to measure textual similarity, and
plotted the top results as network maps. These maps showed emerging
clusters of similar legislation about juvenile runaways, sexual predators,
and other topics. We also ranked terms used in these juvenile laws along
a spectrum representing rehabilitative or punitive approaches to juvenile
justice. We then applied our set of weighted terms to the laws, allowing
us to see at a glance whether a particular law, state, or year seemed to em-
body an approach marked by rehabilitative or punitive language.II These
investigations focused mainly on composing a nation-sized mosaic from
tiles representing the text of laws passed by particular states at particular
times. As a big-picture endeavor grounded on a rich but frequently chal-
lenging data set, we were inspired by the patterns that emerged and heart-
ened that they were largely congruent with the conventional wisdom about
what these patterns should look like.
To test, refine, and define the limits of our tools, however, we also need-
ed to conduct a state-level pilot study. Such a study would allow us to an-
alyze the legislative process itself and tell the story of reforming juvenile
justice in richer detail than the session laws alone could provide. The
pilot study, we believed, might even answer Justice Alito's question
about legislative understanding. But where should we begin?
I. Discovering the Natural State
A legal historian does not necessarily need our database and tool kit to
determine that juvenile justice reform in Arkansas is a promising place
to start. Arkansas was a party to the Supreme Court litigation that culmi-
nated in the Miller decision. Moreover, Arkansas used a law initially
passed in 1989 and then repeatedly revised during the 1990s to prosecute
Kuntrell Jackson as an adult for his role in the November 1999 robbery of a
video store that led to the murder of Laurie Troup, a store clerk.12
Alabama, the other state party, had relied on the more traditional practice
I1. Ibid.
12. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct., 2455, 2461 (2012). See Ark. Code. Ann. Sec. 5-4-104
(b) (1997).
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of judicial waiver and a law established in 1977 to prosecute Miller.13
Therefore, it makes contextual sense to begin in Arkansas to answer
Justice Alito's question about whether legislators understood the sentenc-
ing consequences of making it easier to prosecute adolescents as adults.
Such an examination would also help us to learn more about who the
key institutional actors were at the state level, and to learn more about
the interests that they represented.
The 1992 presidential election of Bill Clinton, who had run as a "New
Democrat" and sought to neutralize the Republican political advantage on
the issue of crime, generated sustained national interest in how his home
state responded to youth violence.1 4 Clinton, who had served as governor
of Arkansas for almost 12 years, was the third youngest person in the na-
tion's history to be elected president and only the third successful candi-
date from a small state.15 Interest in Arkansas, for example, led HBO
Documentaries in the 1990s to broadcast films about gang warfare in
Little Rock and the trials of three adolescents accused of the ritualistic kill-
ing of three young boys in West Memphis.1 6 And, in March 1998, the
"Jonesboro" school shooting focused international attention on the state's
juvenile laws. For contemporaries, Arkansas was a culturally compelling
site for studying youth violence and the state's response to it. But was
Arkansas's lawmaking representative of national trends or was it an
outlier?
In 1996, the National Center for Juvenile Justice had published an
extensive report for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) about state responses to serious and violent juvenile
crime. The report did include a brief case study of Arkansas, titled
"A Rural Response to Violent Crime by Juveniles." 7 The case study
was based on a phone conversation with a staff attorney for Arkansas
Administrative Office of the Courts and did not address whether the state's
experience was representative."
13. Ibid., 2462. Ala. Code. Sec. 12-15-34 (1977).
14. See, for example, Erik Eckholm, "Teen Gangs are Inflicting Lethal Violence on Small
Cities," New York Times, January 31, 1993. On Clinton and crime policy, see Robert
Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America's Prison Empire (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2010), 337-40; and Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Colorblindness, Revised ed. (New York: The New Press, 2012), 56-57.
15. Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random House,
2005), 149.
16. Gang War: Bangin' in Little Rock, directed by Marc Levin (Home Box Office, 1994)
and Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills, directed by Joe Berlinger and
Bruce Sinofsky (Home Box Office, 1996).
17. Torbet et al., States Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime, 53.
18. Ibid., 53, 58.
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Accordingly, we used our data set and digital tools to test our initial as-
sumptions about Arkansas as a promising site for a case study. Our data
had shown a spike in punitive language in the years 1993-96 in state ses-
sion laws concerning juveniles. The Arkansas transfer law was revised in
1991, 1993, 1994, and 1995, years when language in session laws nation-
wide was most punitive.1 9 Moreover, a comparison of the 1997 revised
Arkansas law to the entire corpus of laws passed during the 1990s revealed
that this legislation was similar to laws passed by Nevada and Arizona in
1997, followed by New York in 1998, and then Maryland in 1999
(Table 1).These findings suggested that we needed to learn more about
Arkansas. This more traditional historian's investigation also relied exten-
sively on digital source repositories, including those for law review articles,
state cases, Arkansas newspapers, and Arkansas legislative documents. 20
Our preliminary investigation revealed that Arkansas unexpectedly
needed to create an entirely new juvenile justice system in the late
1980s. The opening of this new system in 1989 was the beginning of a
decade-long political struggle between law enforcement officials and the
state judiciary over how to handle the cases of adolescents accused of com-
mitting serious and violence offenses. This history, we argue, demonstrates
that Justice Alito framed his question about legislative understanding too
narrowly. In Arkansas, for example, the state supreme court was a signifi-
cant institutional player. The justices ensured that key provisions of the
Arkansas Juvenile Code were quite literally in flux in 1997. The
Jonesboro school shooting the following year further complicated matters
and ultimately led the General Assembly, in 1999, to reject the idea of
mandatory sentencing of juvenile offenders younger than 16 years of
age. The answer to Justice Alito's question, at least in Arkansas, came a
year after Jonesboro, and well before the United States Supreme Court
turned its attention in the twenty-first century to the constitutionality of
juvenile LWOP sentences.
We used digital sources to help us locate the site for our historical inves-
tigation. Studying this history, in turn, helped us to develop our digital
tools. For example, the needs of a case study pointed us toward sharpening
the specificity of our tools. We had to learn how to selectively trim our
19. Nystrom and Tanenhaus, "The Future of Digital Legal History."
20. We accessed law review articles through HeinOnline (http://home.heinonline.org/);,
and state cases via LexisNexis (http://www.lexisnexis.com/). We accessed the Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette via NewsBank (http:Iinfoweb.newsbank.com/); and the Arkansas state
legislative materials at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Pages/Previous
%20Legislatures.aspx (accessed June 23, 2015). We recognize that it is unorthodox to foot-
note the digital databases from which we accessed digitized copies of published sources, but
we do so here to help fully reveal the importance of digital tools in every aspect of our work.
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Table 1. Cosine similarity (using 1-term term frequency over inverse document
frequency [TFIDF]) between Arkansas' 1997 transfer law (Act 1229) and
legislation, 1990-2001.
Three page chunk (state, year, vol/page, keyword) Cosine similarity
nv_1997_vi_0801-1000--p3 1-33-juvenile 0.266756
az_1997_vi_0801-1000--pl-3-juvenile 0.264008
ny_1998-v3_3071-3270--p169-171-juvenile 0.261334
md_1999-v6_3955-4100--p112-114-juvenile 0.252489
il_1996-v3_ 3 32 5-3 524 --pl72-174-juvenile 0.244549
az_1995-v1_0001-0200--p82-84-juvenile 0.24192
oh_1991-1992_vl10201-0400--p91-93-juvenile 0.240804
ga_1997 v1 bk2_0925-1124--pl45-147-juvenile 0.23877
id_2000-v1 02 0 3-04 02 --p3i1-33-juvenile 0.23244
nm_1994-vl_0211-0410--p85-87-juvenile 0.22686
results, not only to remove noise at the bottom (i.e., spurious and tenuous
connections), but also to ignore stronger results that resulted from phenom-
ena we were not interested in exploring at the moment (such as interstate
compacts). The need to know exactly what triggered flags of similarity
prompted us to explore the fragments of bill language in close detail, test-
ing our digital tools against our historians' judgment time and again. We
also saw, in our case study, areas where our current tools glossed over im-
portant details, such as the jurisdictional age limit for juvenile court. Such
discoveries helped us to conceptualize important next steps in expanding
our tool kit. Accordingly, the history of juvenile justice reform in
Arkansas that this article presents is doubly digital. It was shaped by the
inquiries our digital tools helped us make, and in turn the history we un-
covered helped us further shape the tools themselves.
II. A Fresh Start?
In 1987, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared the state's existing juvenile
justice system unconstitutional. 2 1 Since 1911, Arkansas had used county
21. Walker v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 291 Ark. 43 (1987). The court
overturned its ruling in Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213 (1919), which held that juvenile courts
were a "local concern" because county courts had jurisdiction over child welfare matters. In
Walker, the Court acknowledged, "Juvenile matters today represent a major field of law with
a statewide and nationwide social importance which preclude them from constituting an area
of merely 'local concern'(49). Therefore, Arkansas needed to establish a new constitutional
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courts to hear juvenile dependency and delinquency cases. Arkansas
Advocates for Children and Families (AACF), an organization co-founded
by Hillary Rodham in 1977, had lobbied for a decade to modernize
Arkansas's juvenile justice system to "secure due process rights and
more standardized procedures." AACF had issued detailed reports that
highlighted the inconsistent handling of cases and sentencing. 22
Rodham, who belonged to the first generation of children's rights law-
yers, had worked as a staff attorney for the Children's Defense Fund
after graduating from Yale Law School in 1973. She eventually moved
to Arkansas with her classmate and soon-to-be husband, Bill Clinton.
After Clinton was elected governor in 1978, Rodham (who later changed
her last name to Clinton) continued to write and speak about children's
rights while practicing and teaching law.23 She also chaired the board of
the Children's Defense Fund until 1992.
As the law professor Martin Guggenheim has noted, the United States
Supreme Court's In re Gault decision (1967) had "created the need for
thousands of lawyers to work in a previously nonexistent field" because
children accused of being juvenile delinquent now had a "constitutional
right to free court-assigned counsel if their parents are too poor to hire a
lawyer themselves." 24 The Gault decision also forced states, including
Arkansas, to re-examine their juvenile justice systems. 25 In Arkansas,
AACF advocated the adoption of an entirely new approach. Its major
goal was to remove children's cases from the county court's jurisdiction
and establish a modern juvenile court system with original jurisdiction
foundation for its juvenile justice system. For a brilliant analysis of the changing intergov-
ernmental role of welfare administration in the twentieth century, see Karen M. Tani's States
of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935-1972 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
22. Due Process Rights and Legal Procedures in Arkansas's Juvenile Court (1980) and
Arrest and Disposition of Juveniles in Arkansas Circuit Court (1983). See, e.g., https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/1 18167NCJRS.pdf (June 23, 2015).
23. Her writings included the important article, "Children Under the Law," Harvard
Educational Review 43 (1973): 487-514. Also see Due Process, Georgetown University
Law Library Blog, 2014. https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/dueprocess/2014/07/09/
1991 -oral-history-interview-with-hillary-rodham-clinton-focusing-on-her-career-in-legal-
services-now-available-online/ (June 29, 2015); and Hillary Clinton, Living History
(New York: Scribner, 2003), 62-100.
24. Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights? (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2005), ix.
25. T. James McDonough, "The Juvenile Court and Judicial Reform in Arkansas,"
Arkansas Law Review 22 (1968-69): 17-42; and David S. Tanenhaus, The Constitutional
Rights of Children: In re Gault and Juvenile Justice (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2011).
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and highly qualified judges. The organization also criticized Arkansas's
relatively unusual practice (although it was becoming more common in
the 1970s) known then as "prosecutor's choice" and now as "direct
file." 26 Direct file means that prosecutors use their charging decision to
prosecute a minor either as a juvenile delinquent in juvenile court or as
an adult in circuit (criminal) court. AACF advocated the more traditional
practice of judicial waiver, which granted a juvenile court judge the author-
ity to waive jurisdiction over a child's case if the judge determined that the
child would not benefit from the court's rehabilitation services. 27
. AACF's decade-long advocacy set the stage for Deborah Lynn Walker, in
1987, to challenge the constitutionality of county courts trying juvenile
cases. 28 Walker sued after losing custody of her children whom the
Arkansas Department of Human Services had declared "dependent-
neglected." The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the General Assembly
in 1911 had impermissibly vested county courts with original jurisdiction
over dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. Moreover, the state's
Juvenile Code, which was enacted in 1975, rested on this unconstitutional
foundation. That code had established a system of referees to act as juvenile
court judges for the county courts. According to the Supreme Court, the
General Assembly had created a new court system but did not have the au-
thority to do so under the Arkansas Constitution. Therefore, the justices de-
clared the state's juvenile justice system unconstitutional. 29
Chief Justice Jack Holt, Jr. acknowledged the desirability of making the
court's ruling "prospective to allow for a period of transition and the pas-
sage of legislation or the possible adoption of a constitutional amendment,"
but explained "we do not have the power to hold a constitutional mandate
in abeyance." 30 Arkansas was left, at least temporarily, without a juvenile
justice system. Circuit and chancery judges were instructed to handle juve-
nile proceedings until a constitutional system could be implemented.31
The Walker decision forced legislative action. By the late 1980s, almost
every nation used specialized juvenile courts to try cases of juvenile delin-
quency and youth crime.32 The Scandinavian (Nordic) nations of Sweden,
26. Wallace J. Mlyniec, "Juvenile Delinquent or Adult Convict-The Prosecutor's
Choice," The American Criminal Law Review 14 (1976-77): 32.
27. Don Crary, "A New System of Juvenile Justice," Arkansas Lawyer 20 (1986): 176.
28. Walker v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 291 Ark. 43 (1987).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 51
31. Chief Justice Jack Holt, Jr., "Major Developments Fiscal Years, 1987-1988," 4
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/I 15505NCJRS.pdf (June 23, 2015).
32. Franklin E. Zimring, Mdximo Langer, and David S. Tanenhaus, eds. Juvenile Justice
in Global Perspective (New York: NYU Press, 2015).
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Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland were the major exceptions. They
never established separate juvenile courts and instead used the child wel-
fare system to handle all cases involving children under the age of 15.33
Although China did not have a national juvenile justice system, the largest
cities, beginning with Shanghai in 1984, began operating juvenile courts.34
Therefore, it was unthinkable at this time in world history that Arkansas
would not establish a new juvenile justice system, especially considering
that political scientists have noted the state's propensity in the late twenti-
eth century to adopt modem social services. 35 The state, for example,
participated in federally funded programs, including ones related to delin-
quency prevention, which provided more than $13,000,000 annually for
social services for Arkansas children and their families. 36
In his concurring opinion, Justice Darrell Hickman predicted: "When the
smoke settles from our decision, two things will become obvious. Our
legal decision is right, and it will not, or should not, disrupt the legal pro-
cess in Arkansas. It will only strengthen it." 37 Governor Clinton appointed
a twenty-one-member Commission on Juvenile Justice, chaired by State
Senator Wayne Dowd, a Democrat from Texarkana, to help secure passage
of a constitutional amendment in November 1988. Adoption of this amend-
ment would allow the General Assembly, when it next met in 1989, to
enact the legislation required to establish a modem juvenile court system.
As Dowd explained, "I think that we've got a golden opportunity to do
something that could be a national model in this state." 38
The commission appointed Little Rock lawyer Donna Gay to serve as its
Executive Director, obtained $168,950 in Title XX grant funds, hired a
staff person, and opened an office at the University of Arkansas's Law
School. From the summer of 1987 through the fall of 1988, the commis-
sion consulted with a wide range of stakeholders that included "circuit
and chancery judges, juvenile referees or masters, intake officers, probation
officers, court clerks, foster parents, parents of children involved with the
33. Tapio Lappi-Seppll, "Juvenile Justice without a Juvenile Court," in Juvenile Justice
in Global Perspective, ed. Franklin E. Zimring, Mdximo Langer, and David S. Tanenhaus
(New York: NYU Press, 2015), 63-117.
34. Weijian Gao, "The Development and Prospect of Juvenile Justice in the People's
Republic of China," in Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective, 121-144.
35. Diane D. Blair and Jay Barth, Arkansas Politics and Government: Do the People
Rule? 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).
36. Walker v. Arkansas, 50. In States of Dependency, Tani analyzes how the New Deal
triggered the intergovernmental restructuring of the logic and administration of social
services.
37. Walker v. Arkansas, 52.
38. Quoted in Donna L. Gay, "Juvenile Justice: Starting with a Clean Page," Arkansas
Lawyer 22 (1988): 203.
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juvenile court system, teachers, school principals, juvenile defense counsel,
Legal Services lawyers, mental health professionals who work with juve-
niles, and contract providers."3 9 Although the commission's report ac-
knowledged "that the system envisioned will necessitate the full
participation of prosecuting or deputy prosecuting attorneys in juvenile
courts throughout the states," it did not mention any meetings with them.
The commission secured $35,000 from Rockefeller Foundation to hire
the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), the research division of
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, to conduct a
comprehensive study of juvenile justice that would include a comparative
analysis of other states' laws. Several years earlier, the NCJJ had complet-
ed a report on children being jailed in eastern Arkansas, and had recom-
mended how the state could remedy this situation.40 The NCJJ agreed
now to craft a juvenile code for Arkansas. Its Executive Director Hunter
Hurst and consultant Robert Dawson traveled to Little Rock to meet
with the commission's subcommittees on court structure and code drafting.
Other national experts on juvenile justice including Ted Rubin of the
Institute for Court Management of the National Center for State Courts,
Mark Hardin for the American Bar Association, and Robert Schwartz of
the Juvenile Law Center, also provided input. Ira Schwartz, the Director
of the Center for the Study of Youth Policy at the University of
Michigan, even arranged for five commissioners to travel to Utah to ob-
serve Salt Lake City's juvenile justice system, which had been recently
overhauled to limit the number of children in secure confinement and to
provide more social services to children and their families. 4 1
Meanwhile, the Arkansas Judicial Department, which had had difficulties
for years in compiling accurate juvenile court statistics from the county
courts, conducted a statewide manual audit of juvenile proceedings in all
the state's courthouses. They discovered that during fiscal year 1987-88,
7,015 individual juveniles had been charged with criminal offenses (3,468
felonies and 6,464 misdemeanors). 42 This audit revealed 3,000 more cases
than had been previously reported. These findings highlighted Arkansas'
39. Arkansas Comiission on Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Courts in Arkansas: Report and
Recommendations (Little Rock, Ark.: The Commission, 1989), 8 (photocopy in authors'
possession).
40. Patricia McFall, "A Study of Regional Juvenile Detention Needs in Phillips, Monroe
and Lee Counties, Arkansas," prepared for the Multi-Jail Commission, January, 1983. http://
www.ncj.org/pdf/McFallStudy.pdf (June 23, 2015).
41. Arkansas Commission on Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Courts in Arkansas, 19.
42. Holt, "Major Fiscal Developments," 4-5.
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decidedly decentralized juvenile justice system and confirmed the AACF's
longstanding complaint that children's cases were handled inconsistently.43
According to Gay, the Arkansas Juvenile Justice Commission had to first
build public support for Amendment 2 before devising a specific legislative
plan." Hillary Clinton and Donna McLarty co-chaired the campaign re-
sponsible for educating voters about "why the state needs the amendment"
and "what the amendment will authorize." They secured $13,104 from the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges to cover the costs of
printing brochures, running advertisements in the Arkansas Gazette and
Arkansas Democrat, and broadcasting radio spots. Clinton and McLarty
also raised $16,000 in private money to fund a lobbying campaign in the
final days leading up to the election.45 Ultimately, their efforts proved suc-
cessful when the amendment passed with 62% of the vote.4 6
The commission then worked to finalize its report to the General
Assembly, which would include a proposed juvenile code. To save time
and money, the commissioners drafted the code themselves instead of pay-
ing for NCJJ to do so.4 7 The commission recommended placing "the juris-
diction for juvenile matters in chancery court" because this option would
be much cheaper than establishing an entirely separate juvenile justice sys-
tem as Utah had done.48
The commission's report revealed how the Gault revolution had created
great expectations for the administration of juvenile justice. Prior to Gault,
non-lawyers often served as a juvenile court judges and referees.4 9 The
Arkansas commission first and foremost sought to professionalize matters
by recommending that juvenile court judges be elected and should have
the same qualifications as circuit and chancery judges. These qualified judg-
es, the commission contended, should also have exclusive authority to make
the critical decision about juvenile transfer. The commission called for the
elimination of direct file because this practice would no longer be needed.
This practice had made sense under the former county court system because
a prosecuting attorney may have been the only lawyer involved in a case.
43. Gay, "Juvenile Justice," 203.
44. Ibid., 203.
45. Arkansas Commission on Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Courts in Arkansas, 10.
46. Kay Goss, The Arkansas State Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011), 239.
47. Arkansas Commission on Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Courts in Arkansas, 24, 32-34.
48. Ibid.
49. Daniel L. Sklor and Charles W. Tenney, "Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court,"
Journal of Family Law 4 (1964): 77-98.
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The commission contended that eliminating direct file would benefit prose-
cutors by shielding them from community pressure in high profile cases.5 0
Although the General Assembly followed the commission's recommen-
dations for judicial qualifications and elections, it did not eliminate direct
file. Instead, Arkansas established a system of direct file and reverse judi-
cial waiver. Prosecutors could file charges in circuit court against 14- and
15-year-olds, if they decided to charge the juvenile with capital murder;
murder in the first degree; murder in the second degree; kidnapping in
the first degree; or aggravated robbery, rape, or battery in the first degree.5 1
The circuit court in such cases had to hold a reverse transfer hearing within
90 days to determine whether to retain jurisdiction or send the case to ju-
venile court.52 In cases involving 16-and 17-year-olds, the prosecutor
could either file charges in circuit court for any "alleged act" that
"would constitute a felony if committed by an adult" or proceed in juvenile
court.53 Either party could, however, request a transfer hearing to move the
case to another court having jurisdiction (i.e., either from juvenile court to
circuit court, or vice versa). The legislature also included several criteria
that courts had to consider in their transfer decisions.54
Some of the core concepts in this new juvenile code, such as categoriz-
ing juveniles by age and alleged offense, had been part of Arkansas' prior
law, which had its roots in English common law.55 Anglo-American court
had used a tripartite system to distinguish children from adults in determin-
ing their culpability for crime, which determined that children under the
age of 7 were incapable by nature of being able to form the necessary intent
to commit a felony. Children from 7 to 14 years of age were presumed to
50. Arkansas Commission on Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Courts in Arkansas, 30. Also see
Allison Boyce, "Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State,"
Arkansas Law Review 46 (1993-94): 989-990.
51. Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 9-27-318(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1991).
52. On reverse transfer, see Barry C. Feld, "Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique," in The Changing Borders of
Juvenile Justice, 120-22.
53. Ibid.
54. These were: the seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the
juvenile in the commission of the offense; whether the offense was part of a repetitive pattern
of adjudicated offenses that would lead to the determination that the juvenile was beyond
rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs, as ovidenced by past efforts to treat
and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts; and the prior history, character,
traits, mental maturity, and any other factor that would reflect on the juvenile's prospects for
rehabilitation.
55. See, for example, Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and thc Anglo
American Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005),
181-229.
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be incapable of forming intent but the state could rebut this presumption. 56
Children older than 14 were prosecuted as adults. More recently, in 1988,
the United States Supreme Court had declared that executing children for
crimes that they had committed before their 16th birthdays violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments.57 The follow-
ing year, however, the high court upheld the constitutionality of the juve-
nile death penalty for 16 and 17-year olds who had committed capital
offenses.58 This history may explain why Arkansas handled the cases of
14- and 15-year-olds differently from those of 16- and 17-year olds.
The age classifications and specific offenses that the legislature adopted
in 1989 generally followed earlier Arkansas practices, including maintain-
ing the minimum age of 10 for juvenile court eligibility. Other sections
of the Juvenile Code, such as the criteria for transfer decisions, were entire-
ly new. So where did this new language come from, and who drafted it?
The state had established a Bureau of Legislative Research in 1947,
which subsequently assisted legislators in researching and drafting
bills. 59 Did these drafters create something new, or did they draw on pre-
existing laws from other states, or perhaps model codes developed by na-
tional organizations? These are difficult questions to answer because from
1955 until quite recently, Arkansas did not publish "committee reports,
committee prints, floor debate, or the minutes of senate and house
proceedings." 60
We used our digital tools to search for likely connections. Because the
Arkansas law was enacted in 1989 and our data set for this pilot study be-
gins only.in 1990, we could not run comparisons with earlier laws. We
could test for similarities going forward, however. First, we looked for sim-
ilarities based on having five-word-long sequences in common. In princi-
ple, documents sharing long phrases would almost certainly contain text
copied from a common source. When testing the 1991 Arkansas law
with this method, we found few promising results. 61 Next, we tested the
1991 Arkansas law against the rest of our data set using a different
56. David S. Tanenhaus, "The Evolution of Waiver out of the Juvenile Court," in The
Changing Border of Juvenile Justice, 13-14.
57. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
58. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
59. Bureau of Legislative Research, 2014. http://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/budget/
budgetRequests/001 1_bIlr.pdf (July 1, 2015).
60. Kathryn C. Fitzhugh, Arkansas Legislative History Research Guide, 2001. http://
www.aallnet.org/chapter/swall/bulletin/fallOl/arkleghistory.html (June 25, 2015).
61. We used the Jaccard similarity method to compare pairs of documents based on five
word overlapping phrases (shingles). See Nystrom and Tanenhaus, "The Future of Digital
Legal History" for further technical details. All comparison pairs scored rather low in this
test; the top scores among them, which resulted from comparisons of the 1991 Arkansas
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Table 2. Cosine similarity (using 1 -term frequency over inverse document
frequency [TFIDF]) between Arkansas' 1991 transfer law and legislation, 1990-
2001.
Three page chunk (state, year, vol/page, keyword) Cosine similarity
va_1994-v2_1211-1410--pl84-186-juvenile 0.364035
co 1996-v2 1601-1 800--p43-45-juvenile 0.328927
va 1997_v2_2235-2434--p70-72-juvenile 0.316152
hi_1997_0601-0800--pl57-159-juvenile 0.313336
sc_1995-v 1_0001-0200--p61-63-juvenile 0.307595
va 1994-v2_1411-1610--p193-195-juvenile 0.305162
wv1995_v_0201-0400--p112-114-juvenile 0.30384
va_1994-v21211-1410--pl96-198-juvenile 0.302774
ms_ 1994-v2_0863-1062--pl60-162-juvenile 0.302344
hi_1999 0401-0600--p49-5 1-juvenile 0.300807
technique. Instead of using phrases, we examined the frequency of individ-
ual words. We also weighted the importance of the words, so that words
that were commonin one document but.rare in the corpus as a whole
would count for more in the final calculation. 62 With this measure, it is dif-
ficult to say whether language may have been borrowed directly; however,
it gives a clearer picture of common ideas and terms. We found that the
Arkansas 1991 bill bore similarity to many of the transfer laws passed dur-
ing the mid-1990s, particularly legislation from Virginia. The top result,
four out of the top ten, and eight out of the top twenty, were from
Virginia (Table 2).63
Subsequent research revealed that the State of Virginia later reassessed
the effectiveness and unintended consequences of this legislation from
language with several laws passed by the state of Tennessee, had seized upon language of
"severability" inserted by both states in their respective laws.
62. Specifically, we weighted single word terms using the term frequency over inverse
document frequency (TFIDF) measure and then compared the documents using the cosine
similarity technique. Our corpus, in this case, was all three page chunks from all states in
the years 1990-2001 that contained the term "juvenile."
63. Later we also ran a preliminary comparison of the 1991 Arkansas law with session laws
from 1985-1989, which had been downloaded but not controlled for quality and were, therefore,
not part of our data set. This preliminary comparison (a single term TFIDF cosine comparison)
highlighted some similarities with laws passed in Ohio in 1985 and 1991, in Colorado in 1987,
and in Mississippi in 1986. Manual examination of these earlier laws suggests that the
Arkansas's 1991 law contained both substantive and procedural similarities about the prosecution
ofadolescent offenders in criminal court. These laws, we suspect, foreshadowed the avalanche of
transfer legislation during the peak years of 1993-1996. We need, however, to do more research to
test this proposition more fully.
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the 1990s, which had enhanced the power of prosecutors to use the threat
of transfer to secure plea deals from juveniles.64 Scholars have noted, in
broad terms, the increasing role played by prosecutorial interests in framing
juvenile justice legislation.6 5 A case study of Arkansas might, therefore,
shed light on the role of prosecutors.
The Arkansas Juvenile Justice commission had noted the Walker case
(1987) "was the precipitating factor" in the creation of the new juvenile
code but that many of its members had "been working in various ways
for much longer than that to improve the system." 66 However, the new sys-
tem that they helped to launch still allowed for prosecutorial choice. And,
as we discovered, prosecutorial discretion continued to be a controversial
subject in Arkansas throughout the 1990s, and into the new century.
III. Interpreting the New Juvenile Code
American juvenile justice has been a work in progress since the creation of the
world's first juvenile court in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. 67 At
century's end, in Arkansas, this historical process of trial and error continued.
This history began with the killing of an African American man by a
14-year-old, white teenager. On June 24, 1990, Robert Christian Walker,
who was hanging out with his friends at a pond near Jacksonville, fired
a shot that killed Edward C. Cooper who was fishing nearby with his fam-
ily. Walker had borrowed the rifle from another teenager, Aaron Lyman,
who was hunting snakes with a friend. Lyman testified that Walker cocked
and aimed the rifle at Cooper before declaring, "I'm going to shoot me a
nigger." He then fired the fatal shot.
Walker provided a different account. He said that Lyman told him that there
was only one bullet in the gun. Walker explained: "So I shot it, and then after-
wards Chris Sinkey said look at those niggers down there. He said let's shoot
64. See, for example, The Report of the Virginia State Crime Commission, 2008. http://
leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/HD 122009/$file/HD I 2.pdf (January 28, 2016).
65. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007). Franklin E. Zimring, "The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer in the
1990s," Choosing the Future for American Juvenile Justice ed. by Franklin E. Zimring
and David S. Tanenhaus (New York: NYU Press, 2014), 45-47. Also see Angela J.
Dwvi-, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor (New York: OAfaid
University Press, 2009).
66. Arkansas Commission on Juvenile Justice, "Juvenile Courts in Arkansas," 38.
67. David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
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us a nigger. And I didn't think anything about it, and I just had the gun sitting
beside my waist, and I pointed it in that direction and shot the-pulled the trig-
ger. And it went off, and when it went off, I dropped the gun." 68
An expert marksman testified that because of the distance (approximate-
ly 162 meters) and weather conditions, "if Walker had aimed directly at
Cooper he would have missed. To hit Cooper, the gun would have to
have been aimed over the victim's head." 69
The prosecuting attorney charged Walker with first degree murder in cir-
cuit court, and Walker then requested a reverse transfer hearing. 70 As the
law professor Barry Feld has noted, Arkansas had created a presumption
of "unfitness," and Walker had to prove that he belonged in juvenile
court.7 1 The hearing tested the new criteria for determining whether a
child belonged in either juvenile or circuit court. The criteria included 1)
the seriousness of the offense (including whether violence was employed),
2) whether the offense was part of a repetitive pattern, and 3) how "prior
history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which re-
flects upon the juvenile's prospect for rehabilitation." Character witnesses
testified that Walker was an ordinary teenager who lived in a mixed-race
neighborhood and had no prior history of either violence or racial hatred.
Therefore, Walker argued that he belonged in juvenile court. The prosecut-
ing attorney presented only "information," the official document that
Arkansas prosecutors filed in criminal cases.72
The judge based his decision on the seriousness of the crime as outlined
by the prosecutor's paperwork and denied Walker's transfer motion.
Walker appealed the decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court, but the
high court determined that the prosecutor's information provided clear
and convincing evidence that the case belonged in adult court. The
Arkansas Supreme Court also held that the trial court judge did not have
to give equal weight to all three criteria in the juvenile court. The high
court also rejected a second petition that Walker filed for a rehearing.73
The trial of Walker for first degree murder exposed a jurisdictional ten-
sion in the state's new juvenile code. At the end of the trial, the judge in-
structed the jury on murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide. The jury found him guilty of the
lesser offense of manslaughter, and the judge sentenced him to 10 years'
68. Walker v. State, 309 Arkansas 23 (1992), 24.
69. Ibid., 25.
70. "Choosing the Forum," 992-993.
71. Feld, "Legislative Exclusion of Offenses," 120.
72. For the current version of the form, see State of Arkansas Criminal Information, 2007.
https://courts.arkansas.gov/system/files/chacovfdf.pdf (June 29, 2015).
73. "Choosing the Forum," 994.
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imprisonment. There was a problem, however. If the prosecutor had initial-
ly charged Walker with manslaughter, then the 14-year-old would have
been automatically tried in juvenile court. Under the new juvenile court
law, 14- and 15-year-olds could only be prosecuted as adults for one of
six enumerated crimes. Manslaughter was not on that list.
Walker appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court on the
grounds that only the juvenile court had the jurisdiction to convict and pun-
ish a 14-year-old for the crime of manslaughter. Justice David- Newbem
noted that courts in Colorado, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, and
Georgia had resolved this same issue by determining that once a criminal
court acquired jurisdiction over a juvenile's case, the criminal court also
acquired jurisdiction over lesser charges.74 Newbem also pointed out
that Massachusetts had adopted a different approach that involved filing
a postconviction petition in juvenile court. 75 The juvenile court judge
would then impose a delinquency sentence. Arkansas's new code expressly
prohibited this approach because it violated the principle of double jeopar-
dy. Even though Walker's attorney asked for this option, the Arkansas
Supreme Court rejected this plea.
Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the majority practice
of other state courts and held that once the circuit court had acquired juris-
diction over a juvenile case, it retained jurisdiction to convict and sentence
the juvenile for lesser included offenses. 76 Part of court's rationale for
adopting this rule was that Arkansas circuit court judges had the power
to reduce sentences imposed by a jury. The court quoted from a
Mississippi decision, which noted that this mitigating option allowed a
criminal court judge to act more like a juvenile court judge.77
Significantly, in her majority opinion for the United States Supreme
Court in Miller v. Alabama, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized how manda-
tory sentencing schemes in capital cases prevented judges from taking
youth into account during sentencing. 78 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme
74. He cited People v. Davenport, 43 Colo. App. 41, 602 P. 2d 871 (1979); Gray v. State,
6 Md. App. 677, 253 A. 2d, 395 (1969); Williams v. State, 459 So. 2d. 777 (Miss. 1984);
Dicus v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, Etc., 97 Nev. 273, 625 P. 2d 1175 (1981); and
Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E. 2d 431 (1985).
75. Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E. 2d 649 (Mass. 1959).
76. Walker v. State, 24.
77. Ibid., 29.
78. Kagan wrote, "But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer
from taking account of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance-
by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult-
these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term
of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender." Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2466.
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Court in 1992 and the United States Supreme Court 20 years later both em-
phasized the importance of criminal court judges having discretion in their
sentencing of minors.
Justice Newbern used the conclusion of his opinion to warn prosecutors
not to overcharge juveniles to defeat the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
He reminded them of the first principle inscribed in Arkansas's Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.8(a): "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." 79 After stating that
the court did not expect prosecutors to "flout the jurisdiction of' of the ju-
venile court, he declared: "Even if one of them were so disposed, we doubt
he or she would be willing to run the risk of being found guilty of an eth-
ical violation under the Rule."80
Justice Donald Corbin, a newly elected member of the court, supported
the majority's legal reasoning, but still dissented. His sparse dissent warned
that the juvenile court itself was in danger. He explained:
I dissent because I believe the result we reach goes against the strong public
policy envisioned at the time of the proposal and the acceptance of the new
juvenile court system by the people of the State of Arkansas. I would follow
the Massachusetts rule mentioned in the majority opinion. I would do so for
reasons of strong public policy. I admit that this is judicial activism, but the
situation deserves this attention unless we are to make a mockery out of our
juvenile court system.81
As Newbern's warning to prosecutors and Corbin's dissent demonstrated,
the judiciary was concerned that the power of prosecutors could undermine
the new juvenile code.
The Arkansas General Assembly did not share these concerns. During
the 1990s, the bicameral legislature, with its 35 senators and 100 represen-
tatives, met biennially in odd numbered years (1991, 1993, 1995, 1997,
and 1999). Like clockwork, the legislature increased the number of enu-
merated excluded offenses for 14- and 15-year-olds and thus further ex-
panded the charging power of prosecutors. 82 For example, Arkansas
added aggravated robbery, rape, or burglary in the first degree in 1991.83
79. Walker v. State, 30. Also see Arkansas Judiciary, Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor, 2016. https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-and-adrninistrative-orders/court-rules/
rule-38-special-responsibilities-prosecutor-0 (June 29, 2015).
80. Walker v. State, 30. In Arkansas, prosecutors have rarely been disciplined. See, for
example, this September 11, 2014, article in the Arkansas Times http://www.arktimes.
con/arkansas/prosecutors-have-all-the-power/Content?oid=3452595 (June 29, 2015).
81. Walker v. State, 30.
82. Feld, "Legislative Exclusion of Offenses," 114.
83. House Bill 1755, March 15, 1991. http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1991/R/
Acts/903.pdf (June 30, 2015).
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As Frank Zimring has noted, this legislative recidivism required minimal
drafting, and produced symbolic capital for legislators who needed to
appear tough on crime. 84 Because of the Walker decision, Arkansas pros-
ecutors knew that the information they filed in circuit court determined the
outcome in reverse transfer hearings.
IV. Legislating during a Moral Panic
The moral panic in Arkansas about youth violence reached new heights after
the general assembly completed its regular session in 1993, and Governor
Jim Guy Tucker called the legislature into a special session in August
1994 to address juvenile crime.85 The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, based
in Little Rock and the most influential paper in the state, had used its editorial
page and reporting to encourage Tucker call a special legislative session to
"get tough" on juvenile crime.
The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette's coverage of youth crime supports
David Garland's argument that media in the late twentieth century "tapped
into, then dramatized and reinforced, a new public experience, an experience
with profound psychological resonance-and in doing so it has institution-
alized that experience." "This institutionalization," he explained, "increases
the salience of crime in everyday life. It also attunes the public's response not
to crime itself, or even to the officially recorded rates, but to the media
through which crime is typically represented and the collective representa-
tions that these media establish over time." 86 The Democrat-Gazette helped
shape the cultural context for the special legislative session.8 7
84. Zimring, "American Youth Violence," 12.
85. Jay Barth, "Arkansas' Juvenile Crime Special Session: An Election Season Success
with Forewarning for Arkansas Politics," Comparative State Politics 15 (1994): 19-27.
For analysis of the history and use of the sociological concept of a "moral panic," see
Kenneth Thompson, Moral Panics (London: Routledge, 1998); and Stanley Cohen, Folk
Devils and Moral Panics 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002). In Rethinking Juvenile
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 10, Elizabeth S. Scott and
Laurence Steinberg classified juvenile crime policy during the 1990s as a moral panic
because "politicians, the media, and the public reinforce[d] each other in an ocalating pat
tern of alarmed response to a perceived social threat."
86. David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 158.
87. For an introduction to the literature on the role of the news media in shaping racialized
perceptions of youth crime during the 1980s and 1990s, see Perry L. Moriearty, "Framing
Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking," Maryland Law Review 69 (2010): 850-
909.
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Beginning in February 1994, the paper ran a series of articles that high-
lighted how Colorado's Governor Roy Romer, a Democrat running for
re-election, called a special legislative session to crack down on youth
crime after a "summer of violence." That session saw the passage of
new laws that criminalized youth handgun possession, incarcerated some
juveniles in the adult prison system, and made juvenile records public.8 8
The articles about Colorado's special session framed the Democrat-
Gazette's two part, front page feature about "efforts nationally to battle juve-
nile crime." The feature began with an article titled "The Kids Think the
System is a Joke: With Youth Crime Rising, States Put Juvenile Justice
System Under the Microscope" and concluded with an article, published on
Valentine's Day, titled "Youth Crime Grows into National Terror."89
To provide "a glimpse at the people behind the juvenile crime statistics,"
the reporters profiled "Jim" a 15-year-old, self-described gang member
who had been in trouble with the law since he was 9 years of age. He
had been committed to state training schools four times previously and
was now held at Pulaski County Juvenile Detention Center, awaiting a ju-
venile court hearing. He had been arrested for a stealing a car. He told the
reporters that detention was "a spank on the hand, then you go home." The
reporters included Jim's perspective as well as that of former gang mem-
bers. They quoted, for example, a 16-year-old former gang member,
who had testified at a December hearing of the state's Youth Gang Task
Force. He stated, "Y'all are just now deciding to do something, and it's al-
most too late. We're not here asking for sympathy. We're here asking for
help. And we're talking about help now-not tomorrow, not a year later,
not two. We're talking about now." 90
The reporters also provided a brief history of the development of
Arkansas' modem juvenile justice system and quoted national experts
who applauded Arkansas for establishing a Division of Youth Services
and replacing the state's largest juvenile facility with smaller regional
wilderness camps. The reporters also noted that "critics of the current sys-
tem, including a number of law enforcement officers and prosecutors"
88. See, for example, Terry Lemons and Jane Fullerton, "'The Kids Have the Hammer
Hanging Over Their Head': Colorado Targets Violent Offenders with New Tougher
Laws," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 13, 1994, 1A. In 1997, the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention published a case study of Colorado's reforms,
see Bilchik, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States, 1994-1996, 51-58.
89. Jane Fullerton and Terry Lemons, "The Kids Think the System is a Joke: With Youth
Crime Rising, State Puts Juvenile Justice System Under the Microscope," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, February 13, 1994, IA; and Jane Fullerton and Terry Lemons, "Youth
Crime Grows into National Terror," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 14, 1994, lA.
90. Fullerton and Lemons, "The Kids Think the System is a Joke."
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complained that the juvenile justice system was "too lax on violent and
habitual offenders, allows too much time to elapse between arrests and
hearings, and doesn't provide enough detention space." Pulaski County
Prosecuting Attorney Mark Stodola stated, "The Arkansas juvenile code
is a handcuff on police and a handcuff on prosecutors. We've got to
give a higher priority to juvenile crime." 9 1
The article mentioned that several legislators were advocating for
Arkansas hold a special legislative session devoted to juvenile crime, but
as Arkansas had just made changes to their judicial code during the
1993 session, other legislators advocated for giving "those changes time
to be implemented." Governor Tucker would not rule out a special session,
but emphasized that it would require "substantial preparation." The article
observed that the legislature would probably not tackle further juvenile jus-
tice reform until 1995.92
Significantly, the article emphasized that youth violence was getting
worse in Arkansas. The authors provided statistics about the dramatic
rise in juvenile crime, including murder, from 1979 to 1992. They also
pointed out that "A cycle of violence has rippled across the state in recent
months-a high school athlete allegedly killed by gang members at
Sherwood, a 3-year-old girl injured by a stray bullet at Little Rock, a
trio of West Memphis teen-agers accused of brutally murdering three
8-year-old boys." 93 The last case they cited was becoming one of the iconic
cases that symbolized the so-called immorality of American teenagers in
the 1990s. Prosecutors accused the teenagers of killing the young children
as part of a satanic ritual. The case of the West Memphis Three, it should
be noted, later became internationally known as an example of prosecuto-
rial misconduct and wrongful conviction.94
Whereas the first article focused on the situation in Arkansas, the sequel
"Youth Crime Grows into National Terror" pointed out that "public opin-
ion polls show that crime-including acts by and against children-tops
the economy and health care as the No. I issue concerning Americans."
The article provided an overview of national trends that included imposing
curfews for minors and installing metal detectors in schools. The reporters
also spoke with law professor and juvenile justice expert Barry Feld, who
explained that the problem of juvenile crime would be compounded by
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Mara Leveritt, "Are 'Voices for Justice' Heard?: A Star-Studded Rally on Behalf of
the West Memphis Three Prompts the Delicate Question," University of Arkansas Law
Review 33 (2010-11): 137-60; and Mara Leveritt, Devil's Knot: The True Story of the
West Memphis Three (New York: Atria Paperback, 2002).
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demographic trends. He explained, "Unless we start implementing pro-
grams that are going to improve their life circumstances, we are guaran-
teed-just based on demographics-a significant increase in youth crime
during the next 10 to 15 years." Feld added, "It's ultimately cheaper to in-
vest in human capital now than it is to try to warehouse the results of ne-
glect later," but worried that "a get-tough-and-throw-away-the-key policy
may be a politically attractive, short-term answer that demagogues can
rally around." Feld was right to worry. 95
In April, Governor Tucker, a Democrat who had replaced Clinton during
his presidential campaign, was running for a 4 year term. Sheffield Nelson,
the Republican challenger, repeatedly criticized Tucker for the state's fail-
ure to address its crime problem. Tucker, who had used his position as a
prosecutor in the early 1970s to launch his political career, appointed an
eighteen member task force of police officers to prepare juvenile justice re-
forms proposals that would be evaluated during a 3 day law enforcement
summit to be held at the Criminal Justice Institute at the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock in July. The governor's office would use the rec-
ommendations from law enforcement officials to prepare legislation for the
General Assembly to consider if the governor convened a special
legislation.
Tucker explained that he selected police officers to serve on the task
force because they were usually "the last ones we ask." He added,
"Usually politicians get an idea in the middle of the night, but law enforce-
ment live it all day, every day." 96 Wayne Dowd, who had chaired the
Arkansas Juvenile Justice Commission and helped write the state's modem
juvenile code in 1989, was skeptical. On the eve of the law enforcement
summit, he stated, "I'm somewhat dubious that law enforcement is going
to come up with a magical solution to juvenile crime." 97
As the chairman of the Senate's powerful Judiciary Committee, Dowd
would play a vital role in shaping or stopping legislation.98 Political scien-
tists, who studied juvenile justice reform in the 1960s and 1970s theorized
that such reform is generally incremental and controlled by a subset of the
legislature, such as Dowd's committee, which had expertise in this area of
95. Fullerton and Lemons, "Youth Crime Grows into National Terror," LA.
96. Mike Rodman, "Youth Crime a Siren's Song for Legislators School Fund Formula
Can Wait, Tucker Say," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 7, 1994, LA.
97. Rachel O'Neal, "Crime Summit Gives Officers Voice in Debate," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, July 6, 1994, IB.
98. Noel Oman, "Judiciary Panels Get Head Start on Session," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, August 16, 1994, 8A; and Noel Oman, "Crime War at Capitol Hits Week 2,"
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 22, 1994, 1A.
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law. 99 Fundamental change, on the other hand, occurs only when juvenile
justice became a major political issue that attracts public interest. 00 Under
these circumstances, experts can lose control of the legislative process and
radical change can happen suddenly. Juvenile justice reform in New York
during the 1970s followed this pattern, which resulted in the state ignoring
its own experts and passing the nation's toughest juvenile law in 1978.101
The moral panic about youth crime suggested that states, such as Arkansas,
might enact even more radical laws in 1994. Dowd, who had helped to
write the state's juvenile code, could prevent this from happening.
The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette reported, "in what at times sounded
like a campaign speech," Governor Tucker told the attendees of the law en-
forcement summit that, "We must make strategic decisions now. One of
those strategic decisions should be to do what no other state has been
able to do-free our citizens from crime and the fear of crime and provide
true domestic tranquility." Tucker acknowledged that there was not time to
create a new juvenile code during a special session. He explained, "If they
recommend a comprehensive revision of the juvenile code, that can't be
done between now and Aug. 15. It is too complex. If they recommend
some specific.. .changes on which there is a pretty good consensus,
that's another matter." 102 The governor's concession that there was not
enough time to create a new juvenile code helped ensure that the legislature
tinkered within the existing framework.
During the 3 day summit at the Criminal Justice Institute at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, law enforcement officers were divid-
ed into twenty groups to address specific issues and each group produced
recommendations. These included implementing a statewide curfew for
teenagers, building more prisons, buying an automated fingerprint identifi-
cation system, requiring background checks for all public and private
school employees, establishing a statewide minimum wage for police offi-
cers, holding annual crime summits, and commissioning a study "on the
three-strikes-and-you're-out concept for violent offenders" that included
99. Edmund F. McGarrell reviews the "open system" literature in Juvenile Correctional
Reform: Two Decades of Policy and Procedural Changc (Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1988).
100. Scholars have described the history ofjuvenile justice in cyclical terms. See, for ex-
ample, Thomas J. Bernard and Megan C. Kurlychek, The Cycle ofJuvenile Justice, 2nd ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
101. McGarrell, Juvenile Correctional Reform, 97-134; Simon Singer, Recriminalizing
Delinquency: Violent Juvcnilc Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 46-74; and Fox Butterfield's All God's Children: The Bosket
Family and the American Tradition of Violence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995),
226-27.
102. O'Neal, "Crime Summit," lB.
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"life prison sentences for those convicted of three violent offenses."l 03
Tucker's staff used these recommendations to prepare materials for legis-
lators to discuss the feasibility of holding a special session.
Meanwhile, on July 31, the Arkansas Democrat Gazette published a
front page article that encapsulated white fears about "predatory" black
youth taking over formerly "safe" neighborhoods. 104 The article began
with the 911 transcript of a phone call from 48-year-old Susan
R. Harris, who had been shot during an apparent burglary and died later
that night at the hospital. The article stated that the responding police of-
ficers said that Harris told them, "Two young niggers came in on me
and shot me." The police later arrested four black teenagers: two were
15 years old, one was 14 years old, and another was only 12 years old.
The detectives quoted in the article said that the 14-year-old was lucky
that he had just celebrated his birthday because "if he had been 14 when
the crime was committed, he would have been charged as an adult." As
the article explained, anyone younger than 14 "must be tried in juvenile
court, where the harshest penalty is confinement in a Department of
Human Services facility until age 18."1105
This shooting helped prompt Alderman Cary Gaines, executive director
of the Arkansas Sheriffs Association, to introduce a resolution on behalf of
the North Little Rock City Council that implored Governor Tucker to call a
special session. The council passed the resolution unanimously and the al-
derman promised to lobby for expanding the number of excluded offenses,
lowering the age at which juveniles could be prosecuted as adults,
103. Rachel O'Neal, "Summit-Goers Concoct 'Rich Brew' of Crime-Fighting
Suggestions," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 9, 1994, lB.
104. There is an extensive literature about the creation of the image of the black criminal
and urban history, see, for example, Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of
Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Urban America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univorsity Pross, 2011). For studies that examino how conceptions of blackness affected
the history of American juvenile justice, see Feld, Bad Kids (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999); William S. Bush, Who Gets a Childhood? Race and Juvenile
Justice in Twentieth-Century Texas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); Victor
Rios, Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys (New York: NYU Press,
2011); Geoff K. Ward, The Black Child Savers: Racial Democracy and Juvenile Justice
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); and Miroslava Chivez-Garcia, States of
Delinquency: Race and Science in the Making of California's Juvenile Justice System
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). For an analysis of media coverage of
these issues in the 1990s, see Steve Macek, Urban Nightmares: The Media, The Right,
and the Moral Panic over the City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006);
and Perry L. Moriearty and William Carson, "Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males
in America," Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 15 (2012): 281-313.
105. Jim Brooks and Jim Kordsmeier, "I've Been Shot," Caller Told Police," Arkansai
Democrat-Gazette July 31, 1994, Al.
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transferring incorrigible violent offenders to adult prison, and building a
new prison for violent youth. Alderman Martin Gipson observed that
many of these proposals had been introduced in the past, but had failed
to pass. 106
The same day that Tucker announced that he was convening a special
legislative session to address youth crime the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
published photos of forty-one people who had been murdered in Little
Rock, and editorialized for "more and tougher laws against crime." They
were blunt. "Until it's known for sure what brings people, especially
young people, to kill, to rob, to vandalize, to threaten, the only sure way to
respond is to respond. To arrest the criminals and put them where they
can't add to the crime stats. That means more and tougher laws against
crime." The editorial concluded, "The state's attention is all yours,
Governor. Lead on."10 7 The paper also kept its readers of abreast of develop-
ments in other states such as North Carolina, which had held a special legis-
lative session in March to address crime, and considered several hundred
bills and ultimately ratified twenty-eight that included mandating the prose-
cution as adults of 13-year-olds charged with first degree murder and provid-
ing judges with the discretion to try 13-year-old felony suspect as adults.o10
Governor Tucker's proposal to the legislature, however, did not call for
lowering the age of criminal responsibility. Instead, he called for expand-
ing the list of excluded offenses for 14- and 15-year olds; making juvenile
records available to prosecutors, school superintendents, victims, and their
families; detaining more juveniles for longer periods of time; lowering the
evidentiary standard to revoke parole; and allowing for courts to order
juveniles and their parents to pay higher restitution amounts. 109 After
children's advocates complained that the proposal did not include preven-
tative programs, the governor agreed to include more funding for such
programs. 110
The most vocal critics of the special legislative session were members of
the state's black caucus and children's rights activists. Representative
Jimmie Wilson from Lexa in the Arkansas Delta declared that the
106. Brenda C. Bankston, "NLR Council to Lobby for Tougher Laws on Youth Crime,"
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 9, 1994, 5B.
107. "Welcome Special Session, Act Against Crime Now," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
August 10, 1994, 8B.
108. Elizabeth Caldwell, "N.C. Crime Session Focused on Prevention," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, August 15, 1994, 7A.
109. "24 Points in Tucker's Call for Special Legislative Session," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, August 10, 1994, 10A.
110. Elizabeth Caldwell, "Tucker Adding Prevention to Session's Agenda," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, August 12, 1994, lB.
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legislative package had "racial overtones" and that the bills' authors "don't
know anything about the practice of criminal law. All you have is people
trying to out-posture each other. .. .Some people do not want to have to
live next to a black person, and some of those people are voting on this
legislation. .. .There is a hatred here of young African-Americans, a fear
that has grown into hysteria." He added, "We're pushing toward armed
conflict between young people and police," and that you would eventually
have more "African-American Arkansans in prison than in high school.", 1 '
Wilson and Amy Rossi, the executive director of AACF, also objected to
proposals to allow juveniles to be questioned without their parents' knowl-
edge. Wilson "likened the proposed police authority to that of South Africa
officials under apartheid."' 12
When the Senate voted to add additional crimes to the list of excluded
offenses for 14-and 15-year-olds, the only senator to vote against the mea-
sure was Senate President Pro Tempore Jerry Jewell, a member of the black
caucus from Little Rock. He asked Senator Steve Bell, a sponsor of the bill
from Bateville, "Would you agree we're trying to make men out of boys?"
Bell replied, "This is not trying to make men out of anybody. This is trying
to punish people who commit very serious crimes." The bill, which passed
33 to 1, added the following crimes to the list of excluded offenses: second
degree battery, terroristic acts, unlawful discharge of firearms from a vehi-
cle, felonies committed with firearms, soliciting minors to join gangs, and
the criminal use of prohibited weapons.1 3 Cary Gaines declared, "From a
sheriff's perspective, this is the best legislative session for law enforcement
ever." 1 14
The session expanded the powers of police officers and prosecutors. For
example, police could now jail a juvenile who illegally possessed a firearm,
and the prosecutor could use forfeiture proceedings to confiscate it.
Moreover, if the juvenile had been in a motor vehicle at the time of arrest,
then the prosecutor could also petition to confiscate the motor vehicle.i1 5
This ten page act was five times longer than the entire transfer section of
111. Meredith Oakley, "Lawmaker Sees Racism in Session," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, August 17, 1994, 1lB.
112. Elizabeth Caldwell and Rachael O'Neal, "Bill Cuts Parental Strings on Police,"
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette," August 18, 1994, 1A. Also see Diane D. Blair and Jay
Barth, Arkansas Politics and Government, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2005), 207.
113. Rachel O'Neal, "Senate Lowers Age to 14 for Nine Adult Crimes," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, August 19, 1994, lA.
114. Noel Oman, "Crime War at Capitol Hits Week 2," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
August 22, 1994, lA.
115. Senate Bill 5, August 16, 1994, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1993/S2/
Acts/56.pdf (July 1, 2015).
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the juvenile code, which itself had grown in length. The legislature used
the special session to add nine more excluded offenses for 14-and
15-year-olds, and added that prosecutors could file charges against anyone
"at least fourteen (14) years old when he engaged in conduct that consti-
tutes a felony" under Arkansas's Code.' 16
However, the Arkansas General Assembly had neither lowered the age
of criminal responsibility (which remained at 10) nor the juvenile court's
upper jurisdictional age limit (which remained at 18). Instead, the legisla-
ture gave prosecutors more power to determine on a case-by-case basis
how to proceed against 14- and 15-year-olds. The subtitle of the legisla-
tion-"TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL OFFENSES FOR WHICH A
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY MAY CHARGE A FOURTEEN- OR
FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD JUVENILE IN CIRCUIT COURT"-made this
abundantly clear.117
After the session concluded, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette editorial-
ized that it was a "fine start toward a safe state." The paper lauded legisla-
tors for avoiding grandstanding and partisanship and pointed out that "by
the end of the eight-day session, Republican senators praised the agenda of
a Democratic governor-in an election year." They added, "to quote Mike
Huckabee, the state's Republican lieutenant governor: 'It's almost like a
Republican package."' The editorial board explained, "That may not be
what the Democratic governor wanted to hear, but he asked for it. And
he got it." The paper acknowledged that "locking up kids with adults is
not a palatable prospect, but if they're going to break adult laws, they
need to know that they will face adult punishment." Plus, "some of
these defendants are "kids" only chronologically. The time has passed
when novels like Lord of the Flies can shock by displaying the human spe-
cies' capacity for wanton brutality at an early age. Just look in Little
Rock's jails, or, worse, on its streets for examples of teen killers, and vic-
tims. It's time deterrence made a comeback, permissiveness hasn't
worked." They further noted, "You asked for it, Guv, you got it:
Tougher laws on juvenile crime."' 18
116. These new excluded offenses were: kidnapping; battery in the second degree; posses-
sion of a handgun on school property; aggravated assault; terroristic acts; unlawful discharge
of a firearm from a vehicle; any felony committed with a firearm; soliciting a minor to join a
criminal street gang; criminal use of a prohibited weapon; or a felony attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy; or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses that were already excluded. http://
www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1 993/S2/Acts/40.pdf (July 1, 2015).
117. House Bill 1019, August 24, 1994. http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1993/S2/
Acts/40.pdf (July 1, 2015).
118. "Grading the Session: A Fine Start Toward a Safer State," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, August 29, 1994, 4B.
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By 1996, criminologists knew that juvenile crime had already begun to
decline precipitously. This drop began just as states, such as Arkansas, con-
tinued to revise their juvenile codes during the height of the moral panic."19
While criminologists debated the causes of this crime drop, the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) reported, "criminal
justice prognosticators are warning that the downturn could merely be a
lull before the next storm of juvenile violence." The report credited John
J. Dilulio, Jr., a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton
University, and James Alan Fox, a professor of criminal justice at
Northeastern University, for being "the most vocal espousers of this theo-
ry." They quoted Fox's warning that "given the trends, we may face a
bloodbath that makes the 1990s look like the good old days."' 20 Dilulio,
with William Bennett and John Walters, popularized the term "super-
predators" to describe in racially charged language these teenagers who
would soon trigger the blood bath. 12 1
The OJJDP report included a section-"A Dissenting Voice"-that de-
scribed Frank Zinming's critique of the prognosticators' assumptions and
methods. And, as Zimring has more recently pointed out, the demographic
time bomb that Fox and Dilulio predicted turned into "the most sustained
and substantial decline in youth homicide in modem US history."1 22 The
falling juvenile crime rate later played a role in Arkansas' reconsideration
of its juvenile code.
V. Judicial Second Thoughts
While the Arkansas General Assembly continued to expand the power of
prosecutors, the Arkansas Supreme Court grew concerned that reverse
transfer hearings did not serve as a judicial check on prosecutorial over-
charging of minors. In Sanders v. State (1996), a decision that affirmed
a circuit court judge's denial of 17-year-old Christopher Sanders' appeal
to be transferred to juvenile court, Justice Robert H. Dudley stated that
the case "was a catalyst for discussion on the need to review our past in-
terpretation of parts of the juvenile code." He explained why. "This case
119. See, for example, Bilchik, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States, 1994-
1996.
120. Ibid., 6-7.
121. William J. Bennett, John J. Dilulio, Jr., and John P. Walters, Body Count: Moral
Poverty ... and How to Win America's War Against Crime and Drugs (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1997).
122. Franklin E. Zimring, "American Youth Violence: A Cautionary Tale," in Choosing
the Future for American Juvenile Justice, 19.
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exemplifies the fact that, under our current interpretations of the code, pros-
ecuting attorneys can file a serious charge against a juvenile in circuit court
and do nothing more. It may be that there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port the charge, and a transfer may be denied." In this particular case, the
prosecutor charged Sanders, who was accused of putting a knife to the
throat of a 9-year-old and threatening to kill him, with aggravated assault
and terroristic threatening in the first degree. Justice Dudley highlighted
that "the trial judge was apparently frustrated by a total lack of proof by
the State. He even inquired whether the knife alleged to have been used
was a butter knife or a butcher knife, and the State did not know."1 23
Justice Dudley concluded that the high court was changing its mind
about reverse transfer hearings. He stated, "The type of proceeding was
not envisioned by the drafts of the juvenile code, and we did not intend
for our interpretations to do away with the need for a meaningful hearing.
As a result, we issue a caveat that in juvenile transfer cases tried after this
date, we will consider anew our interpretation of the juvenile code when
the issues are fully developed and briefed."1
24
This decision to make a later decision prompted Representative Jimmy
Jeffress, a school teacher and Democrat from Crossett, to introduce
House Bill 1154, "AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE 9-27-318 TO
PROVIDE THAT A DELINQUENCY PETITION OR AN INFORMATION
ALONE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT AN OFFENSE IS SERIOUS
AND VIOLENCE WAS EMPLOYED IN ITS COMMISSION FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER A JUVENILE CAN BE
TRIED AS AN ADULT; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." 25 The bill ac-
knowledged that the Arkansas Supreme Court had not yet overruled
Walker and later precedents, but cautioned that "the Court has repeatedly re-
treated from its holding." Therefore, the bill stated: "It is the express intent of
this act to reinstate the holding of Walker and make it clear that the charge
filed by a prosecutor alone is sufficient to establish that an offense is serious
and that the juvenile employed violence in its commission."1 26 This preven-
tive legislation died that May in committee.
Jeffress and several colleagues also unsuccessfully attempted in 1997
to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 8, and to lower
the transfer age in the juvenile code from 14 to 12.127 The General
123. Sanders v. State, 423.
124. Ibid.
125. House Bill 1554, 1997. ftp:/Iwww.arkleg.state.ar.us/bills/1997/HTM/HB1554.pdf
(June 26, 2015).
126. Ibid.
127. House Bill 1556, 1997. http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1997/R/Bills/
HB1556.pdf (July 1, 2015).
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Assembly, however, retained the juvenile code's age structure and
added only the crimes of escape from a correctional institution and attempt-
ed battery to the list of excluded offenses. 128 Arkansas later used this re-
vised 1997 transfer law as the basis for the prosecution of Kentrull
Jackson.1 29
In light of state's extensive record of expanding the list of excluded of-
fenses from 1991 to 1997, the Arkansas General Assembly clearly con-
doned prosecuting and imprisoning 14- and 15-year olds, and some of
its members, such as Jeffress, were ready to throw away the key; however,
this legislative history also needs to include the judiciary because the
Arkansas Supreme Court reasserted its responsibility to interpret the state's
juvenile code.
On December 11, 1997, the high court announced its decision in
Thompson v. State, which overturned Walker and its progeny of
cases. 130 The Pulaski County prosecutor's office had charged Djuane
Thompson, who was 16, with armed robbery of a taxi driver and another
person. Thompson requested a reverse transfer hearing. At the hearing,
the deputy prosecutor presented only a charging document. The defense
had Thompson's mother testify on her son's behalf; however, Pulaski
County Circuit Judge Langston relied solely on the prosecutor's paperwork
(and no additional evidence) to deny Thompson's petition to be transferred
to juvenile court. Although Senior Prosecuting Attorney John Johnson stat-
ed that his staff keep up "with where the Supreme Court's going and what
they're going to be requiring for these hearings," he acknowledged that his
staff attorney in this case had failed to do so.131
In its 5 to 2 decision, the Supreme Court held that "from the date of
this opinion forward, there must be some evidence to substantiate the seri-
ous and violent nature of the charges contained in the information.
Accordingly, all prior decisions inconsistent with this opinion are hereby
overruled." The court ordered that Thompson's case be transferred to juve-
nile court. Justice Annabelle Clinton Imber's majority opinion did not,
however, determine whether the juvenile or the state bore the burden of
proof in the hearing, because neither party had raised that issue. In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Newbem argued that the court should "not duck
the issue, and we should not create a hybrid, unclear situation that we or
128. House Bill 1343, 1997. http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1997/R/Acts/1229.
pdf (July 1, 2015).
129. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct., 2445, 2461 (2012).
130. Thompson v. State, 330 Ark. 746 (1997).
131. Elizabeth McFarland, "High Court Gives Ruling on Juveniles: Make a Case for
Children in Adult Court, Justices Say," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, December 12, 1997,
Bl.
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the General Assembly will have to undo later."1 32 The dissenters
agreed that prosecutors should have to "offer some proof of the crime
itself to meet the seriousness-and-violence criterion," while contending
that the burden of proof should remain with the juvenile. They objected
to the court's holding that Thompson's case should be heard in juvenile
court, especially as the court's decision overturned nineteen prior
cases holding that "a criminal information is sufficient to meet the
seriousness-and-violence factor."1 33 They concluded that Thompson's
case should be remanded to the circuit court, which could then conduct an-
other reverse transfer hearing in which the judge evaluated actual evidence.
The meaning of the Arkansas Juvenile Code in 1997 was, therefore, in
flux at year's end, and the General Assembly was not scheduled to meet
again until 1999.134 As a result, the legislative history of juvenile justice
reform in Arkansas from 1989 to 1997 does not provide a clear answer
to Justice Alito's question. However, there was more history to be made
before the decade and century ended.
VI. Jonesboro and Extended Jurisdiction
During the legislative interregnum, 13-year-old Mitchell Johnson and
I1-year-old Andrew Golden stockpiled rifles and ammunition. On March
24, 1998, they ambushed and killed four classmates and a teacher at
Westside Middle School, about two miles (3.2 km) from Jonesboro. 135
They also wounded ten other students. The "Jonesboro" school shooting,
as it became known locally and nationally, was the third high profile school
shooting in the United States in 6 months. How the state of Arkansas re-
sponded to this case provided a more definitive to answer to Justice
Alito's question.
In the wake of Jonesboro, Donna Gay, who had served as executive
director of the Arkansas Juvenile Justice Commission in the late 1980s,
stated, "Everybody is going to be looking at everything right now because
it is so high profile. I mean, the whole country is looking at it." The
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette editorialized about Jonesboro very differently
than it had about youth violence in 1994. The editorial board noted:
132. Ibid., 753.
133. Ibid.
134. In 2008, Arkansas amended its constitution to provide for annual legislative sessions.
135. Westside School Shooting, The Encyclopedia ofArkansas History & Culture, 2016.
http://wiv.encyclopediaofarkantas.net/encyclopedia/entry detail.aspxentrylD-3717 (June
25, 2015).
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The rule in this business is that, if there is nothing to say in an editorial, then
don't say it. But there comes a time to break that rule, too. We cannot think of
anything to add this morning to the sick feeling, the tears, the grief that is like
fear, which all of Arkansas feels now. We are so, so sorry. So mystified. We
cannot even think of what to pray, except "Oh, God!" We look at the bank of
televisions in the newsroom and see our own children's faces in the place of
those on the screen, and are wordless. We have nothing to say and yet to
Jonesboro, to the families, to the teachers, we desperately want to say ...
something. Consider this a long silent hug.1 36
This mournful language about seeing "our own children's faces" suggested
that the children of Jonesboro, both the victims and implicitly their killers,
were different from the African-American children who had been cast by
so many commentators as feral "super-predators." 3 7
Mike Huckabee, who had become governor following Tucker's resigna-
tion after a felony conviction for fraud, announced that he was putting to-
gether a task force to rewrite the state's juvenile justice code but "stopped
short of calling for lawmakers to lower the age at which children may be
tried as adults." He explained, "The parent side of me says yes, I would do
it in a minute. But there is the governor's side of me that has to look at this
long term and ask, 'Do we want to put a 10-year-old-child in prison for life
or put him to death?" He added, "If the crime is that horrendous, maybe we
have to start looking at those things. But we should never do it with a spirit
of comfort. We should do it with an extraordinary sense of caution and
deep thought."1 38
Some commentators, such as Pennsylvania lawyer Linda Collier, used
Jonesboro to rally national support for the abolition of juvenile courts' ju-
risdiction over all cases of serious and violent crime. 139 Attorney General
Janet Reno even investigated the possibility of charging Johnson and
Golden with a federal crime, so that they could be imprisoned beyond
their eighteenth birthdays. 14 0 Under Arkansas's Juvenile Code, the
teens could be held in a juvenile facility until they turned 18, but they
would then have to be released, because Arkansas did not have a
136. "What is there to Say? The Shootings at Jonesboro," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
March 25, 1998, B10.
137. For an analysis of the rise and impact of racialized media coverage of youth crime
during this period, see Perry Moriearty, "Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal
Decisionmaking," Maryland Law Review 69 (2010): 850-909.
138. Michael Whitely and Rachel O'Neal, "Huckabee to Create Task Force to Revise
Juvenile Justice Code," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 26, 1998, Al.
139. Linda Collier, "Adult Crime, Adult Time; Outdated Juvenile Laws Thwart Justice,"
Washington Post, March 29, 1998, Cl.
140. Jane Fullerton, "Justice Department Eyes Charging 2 Arkansas Boys," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, March 27, 1998, Al.
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facility to incarcerate juvenile offenders between the ages of 18 and 21.141
Others, such as Paul Kelly, a senior program coordinator for AACF, wor-
ried because the people in Arkansas were talking about "frying" the
Jonesboro shooters, "and anyone else like them."1 42 Representative
Jeffress, who had unsuccessfully sought to lower the state's age of criminal
responsibility, now proposed giving prosecuting attorneys the power to
charge any juvenile as an adult "no matter the age." 14 3
Arkansas's legislative response to the Jonesboro shooting surprised
many. Governor Huckabee, who was running for re-election that fall, did
not call for a special legislative session. He did, however, publish a
book on June 1, 1998, titled Kids That Kill, which used both the "super-
predator" thesis and the Jonesboro school shooting to frame his analysis
of the nation's so-called spiritual crisis. 1"
Several legislative committees held a joint meeting to seek advice from
state experts about what the legislature should do about juvenile justice re-
form during its next regular session in 1999. The consensus of these ex-
perts was to avoid over-reacting. In her testimony, Ami Rossi, the
Director of AACF, emphasized that violent juvenile crime had. been de-
creasing since 1993. She and other witnesses stressed that Jonesboro was
an aberration. Larry Norris, director of the state's Department of
Corrections, told the legislators that his agency did not want to incarcerate
children with adults because it endangered the children. "We are not your
solution," he testified. 145 Representative James Luker, a Democrat from
Wynne, observed, "It's probably good that we have so long before the
next session. If this had happened 30 days before a session, there's no tell-
ing what we would have seen."' 4 6
Huckabee, unlike Tucker, did not ask law enforcement officials to
propose legislative solutions to the problem of youth violence. Instead,
he appointed a task force-known as the Governor's Working Group
141. Kenneth Heard, "Governor Pitches Changing Laws, Campaigning in Jonesboro, He
Vows Rules on Releasing Youth Offenders,"Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April 29, 1998, B3.
142. David Firestone, "Arkansas Tempers a Law on Violence by Children: A Moderate
Response to Schoolyard Killings," New York Times, April 11, 1999, 20.
143. Noel Oman, "Nation to Train Its Eyes on State's Juvenile Justice System," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, March 26, 1998, A14.
144. Mike Huckabee, Kids That Kill (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1998). When
Huckabee later ran for president in 2008, his critics questioned the appropriateness of a state
governor profiting from a local tragedy. See, for example, Richard A. Serrano, "Huckabee
Book Deal After School Tragedy Still Rankles," Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2008.
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/26/nation/na-huckabee26. (July 2, 2015).
145. Ray.Pierce, "Go Slow on Juvenile Justice Legislation, Experts Tell Panel," Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette, April 2, 1998, B3.
146. Ibid.
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on Juvenile Justice-which was similar in its composition and in its
approach to the commission that Clinton had appointed in 1987.147 Like
that earlier commission, this working group consulted with national experts
in the field of juvenile justice such as Laurence Steinberg, a specialist
in adolescent psychology and the director of the newly established
MacArthur Foundation's Research Network on Adolescent Development
and Juvenile Justice. Steinberg echoed the sentiments of local experts
who cautioned against over-reacting to what had happened in Jonesboro.
He explained, "Making huge changes in our laws in response to a small
number of extensively publicized incidents is letting a very small tail
wag a very large dog. Outrage is an understandable emotion, but it is
not a good backdrop against which to make sensible public policy." 148
Steinberg cautioned against lowering the age at which a child could be
prosecuted as an adult and also against putting children into adult prisons.
Both legal responses to youth crime, he cautioned, would make matters
worse in the long run. Instead, he recommended extending the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court over such children until they turned 25.
Law enforcement officials did serve on and testify before the task force,
but this time they were only one of many groups in the process. Pine Bluff
Prosecuting Attorney Betty Dickey, the first woman to be elected a prose-
cutor in Arkansas, who was running for attorney general, testified that pros-
ecutors required more discretion to charge children who were younger than
14 years old as adults.149 Ouachita County Sheriff Ben Garner, who served
on the task force, similarly provided his colleagues with the results of a sur-
vey of sheriffs that asked "what age a child should be required to stand trial
in adult court." Garner reported that sheriffs' responses varied "from the
age of 8 to 12." He also supported giving law enforcement access to juve-
nile records, so they could start tracking certain youth sooner. 150 For
Arkansas' juvenile court judges extended sentencing could serve as their
pathway to securing judicial waiver.
117. The working group included two juvenile court judges, one juvenile probation offi
cer, one prosecuting attorney, one sheriff, and one police chief. Other members included rep-
resentatives from the fields of counseling, education, law, social services, and medicine.
Rachel O'Neal, "25 Chose to Review State Laws on Juveniles," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, March 27, 1998, AO.
148. Rachel O'Neal, "Extending Adult Penalties to Young Criminals Bad Idea, Experts
Tell Panel," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 20, 1998, B 1.
149. Ray Pierce, "Code Needs Teeth to Hold Juveniles Accountable, Dickey Says,"
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 21, 1998, B5.
150. Linda Satter, "Making the Time Fit the Crime," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June
29, 1998, Al.
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This time the state's juvenile court judges played a more prominent role
in the process. They supported a "blended" or "extended jurisdiction" that
would allow them to retain jurisdiction over juveniles' past their eighteenth
birthdays. This approach had become popular in the mid-1990s because it
appealed to children's advocates as well as prosecutorial interests. For
children's advocates, blended sentencing promised to provide more due
process protections for juveniles in juvenile court and to postpone fateful
sentencing decisions until adolescents became adults. For prosecutors,
blended sentencing schemes promised to expand their power within the
juvenile court and to prosecute younger children as adults. 5 1
Slightly a year after the Jonesboro school shooting, the Arkansas
General Assembly passed and Governor Huckabee signed "the Extended
Juvenile Jurisdiction Act."1 52 Reporting on the adoption of the state's
"Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act," the New York Times announced
that "Arkansas Tempers a Law on Violence by Children: A Moderate
Response to Schoolyard Killings."1 53 The article summarized the effects
of the law as lifting a barrier to prosecuting children young than 14
years old as adults, while simultaneously imposing a major burden on pros-
ecuting attorneys. The Times quoted Didi Sallings, Executive Director of
the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, whom the State Senate had
commissioned to write the psychological sections of the act. She stated,
"They've really put some good protections in there for younger children.
It will be a rare kid who can pass the competency test and be tried as an
adult, which is just the way I intended it." Brent Davis, who had prosecuted
the Jonesboro case in juvenile court, criticized the new law. "I pity the
prosecutor who has to try and figure out this law," he stated. He added,
"It started out as a good effort, but then they let all these people from
the criminal defense bar work on it to make it a consensus bill, and they
loaded it up with all this psychobabble. There's no real likelihood this
law could be used."' 54
A broad coalition of interest groups had drafted the Extended
Jurisdiction Act; however, the law still placed enormous discretionary
power in the hands of prosecuting attorneys. Although it would be difficult
to prosecute a child younger than 13 years old for capital murder or murder
151. For a contemporary assessment of the scholarly debate over the costs and benefits of
blended sentencing, see The Changing Borders ofJuvenile Justice, 45-82, 145-80, 407-23.
152. Act 1192 of 1999. http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/1999/R/Acts/Actll92.pdf
(July 2, 2015).
153. David Firestone, "Arkansas Tempers a Law on Violence by Children," New York
Times, April 11, 1999. http:/www.nytimes.com/1999/04/l1/us/arkansas-tempers-a-law-on-
violence-by-children.html?pagewanted=all (January 6, 2016).
154. Ibid.
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in the first degree because the state had to "overcome presumptions of lack
of fitness to proceed and lack of capacity," the presumption shifted from
the state to the juvenile, if the juvenile was 13 years old at the time of
the alleged offense. Prosecuting attorneys could also now request extended
jurisdiction in all cases involving 14- and 15-year-olds who committed an
"excluded offense." Once a juvenile was serving an extended sentence, the
state could petition the juvenile court at any time to impose an adult
sentence.
An extended sentence, in effect, postponed the final verdict in a juve-
nile's case. Six months prior to the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, if no ear-
lier hearings had been held to modify the initial juvenile sentence, the
juvenile court would hold a hearing to determine "whether to release the
juvenile, amend or add any juvenile disposition, or impose an adult sen-
tence." The adult sentence could be for up to 40 years in prison, but
could include "any term up to and including life" for "juveniles adjudicated
for capital murder and murder in the first degree." The length of such sen-
tences, critics contend, undermines the core mission of the entire juvenile
justice system.
The Extended Jurisdiction Act also did not eliminate the Juvenile Code's
transfer provisions for 14- and 15-year-olds. Instead, the new law substitut-
ed judicial waiver hearings in juvenile court in place of reverse transfer
hearings in circuit court. The procedural change promised to provide a
more meaningful hearing, because the judge had to "make written find-
ings" and consider all of the factors listed in the new law. The law still re-
quired that the judge apply a "clear and convincing" standard. Arkansas
had finally granted juvenile court judges the authority to make transfer de-
cisions. However, as subsequent empirical research has demonstrated, ex-
tended or blending sentencing schemes had "net-widening" effects that led
to more juveniles being sentenced and incarcerated as adults.15 5 Therefore,
the Arkansas Extended Jurisdiction Act may simply have been another
chapter in a larger cautionary tale about the unintended consequences of
juvenile justice reform during the 1990s.
VII. Conclusion
Arkansas' history of juvenile justice reform is especially interesting
because Hillary Rodham and Bill Clinton, who helped to build the state's
155. Marcy R. Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, "The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform,
Blended Sentencing, and the Law of Unintended Consequences," Journal of Criminal Law
& Criminology 91 (2000-2001): 997-1072.
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new system of juvenile justice at the end of the 1980s, became dominant
historical actors on the national and international stage in the 1990s. 156
Although it is tempting to follow the Clintons to the White House and
write the history of juvenile justice reform in the 1990s as a beltway
story, scholars instead should strongly consider studying the interstate dif-
fusion of transfer laws because state and local actors make the critical de-
cisions about how these systems operate.157 Digital tools may help
historians to piece together this complicated history.
As this article has demonstrated, historians can create digital archives of
legislation and then use the power of digital tools to interrogate them from
many starting points, searching for promising spots to dig deeper. Digging
deeper, zeroing in on a single state set in broader context then changed our
working environment, challenging us to adjust and encouraging us to re-
think the suitability of our tools and create new ones for this different
sort of work. For future digital legal history topics, we expect this dance
to continue: our digital tools and sources point us to fresh ground, which
we need new tools to fully plow, and which tools in turn we place in
our expanding tool kit for possible use on the next fresh topic. This process
of digital discovery and refinement has gotten us closer to answering ques-
tions about the spread of legislation from state to state, for example, and
has helped us think about the evolution of court precedent.
We plan to employ ever-more-sophisticated digital tools and increasing-
ly comprehensive data sets to discover and analyze historical phenomena
currently just out of reach. Digital legal history-the combination of digital
computing with careful qualitative analysis and interpretation-is rapidly
advancing, drawing models and ideas not only from digital history and
the digital humanities, but also from computational legal studies and the
important role played within the legal profession by digitized documents
in legal education and practice. For example, it may be possible to use dig-
ital computing techniques to isolate substantive changes in juvenile laws
that fundamentally affected the administration of justice systems from
the thousands of largely symbolic legislative tweaks that did not.158
Perhaps digital tools could also make it possible to undercover the role
that national organizations and associations play in the drafting of local
156. For an overview of President Clinton's efforts to use federal legislation to crack
down on youth crime, see Nellis, A Return to Justice, 52-53.
157. Zimring and Tanenhaus, Choosing the Future, 216-33.
158. Researchers, for example, have used regression analysis to isolate specific changes in
the state laws, which have affected juvenile incarceration rates: National Juvenile Justice
Network, "The Comeback States: Reducing Youth Incarceration in the United States",
2016. http://www.njjn.org/our-work/the-comeback-states-reducing-juvenile-incarceration-
in-the-united-states (January 6, 2016).
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and state laws by drafting and promoting model language in multiple juris-
dictions. 159 They might even help to explain what happened at the state
level after the moral panic of the mid-1990s subsided and before the
United States Supreme Court's newfound interest in American juvenile
justice developed.
Our next steps for our ongoing digital legal history project will consist,
we suspect, of three interrelated efforts: to improve the resolution of our
sources, to search for connections and similarities, and to analyze legal lan-
guage from a distance. Improving our sources means expanding the
breadth of our data, by digitizing or downloading more of it, improving
the accuracy of results through correcting text recognition errors, and, per-
haps most importantly, dividing our data into increasingly meaningful sub-
documents. 160 Our search for connections and similarities will include
broadening our application of methods that we have already used, such
as Jaccard, Sorenson, and cosine similarity measures, as well as finding
other techniques pioneered by scholars in information retrieval and other
fields. We also plan to further explore similarities based on particular sig-
nificant elements of laws that we might be able to extract using natural
language-processing techniques, such as ages for punishment, sentencing
guidelines, distinctive court structures, and particular offenses. Finally,
we will increase our efforts to analyze legal language computationally,
using techniques derived from and inspired by "distant reading" in the dig-
ital humanities, but with special recognition of the opportunities and chal-
lenges posed by the repetition and specific vocabulary found in laws and
other legal documents. One such example is our ranking of laws based
on where their language falls on a spectrum of rehabilitation to punish-
ment, but others might include attention paid to incremental versus sweep-
ing change, or the creation and evolving missions of administrative
divisions.
Fulfilling even a portion of the promise of digital legal history, however,
will be a challenge, for our project as well as for the field more broadly.
Even if better digital tools are invented or further adapted to the purposes
and methods of historians,, digital legal historians must attempt to under-
stand these tools, in their often-opaque computational complexity. This
might be accomplished through curricular innovations at the graduate
school level, one-time or ongoing partnerships between legal historians
159. See, for example, the Big Data for Social Good project, 2015. http://dssg.uchicago.
edu/lid/ (January 6, 2016).
160. For example, creating individual bills as units of analysis, instead of the multipage
chunks of text we used here, will require tedious tuning of the splitting algorithm to account
for a wide range of printing styles found in session laws; however, if this is done, it will
permit us to speak meaningfully about the number of relevant bills passed in any given year.
995
Law and History Review, November 2016
and technologists, training aimed at practicing legal historians, or a combi-
nation of all three.' 61 Acquiring the technological competency needed to
execute and analyze digital legal history is a necessary first step.
A second challenge is even more serious: the ability to obtain open data
sets of source material, of sufficient size and coverage, to enable broad-based
analysis using computational methods. Much valuable work might be possi-
ble using already developed digital tools, if only appropriate data were avail-
able in digital form in bulk. The sort of digital access appropriate for a
traditional user, including limitations posed by the quantity of material avail-
able, the size and format of permitted downloads, the ease of machine inter-
action with the download interface, and the cost of licensing, can be a
stumbling block for legal historians who want to conduct additional compu-
tational analysis. Here is a small but telling example: in writing this piece,
after relying on the Arkansas newspapers in constructing the narrative at
the heart of this essay, we attempted to download the newspaper articles sys-
tematically from a subscription-based library database, by hand, to analyze
their text computationally. We were stymied after downloading only 18
months' worth, however, by automatically triggered access blocks. Some
crucial efforts have already been made to make bulk data freely available
to researchers and the public, such as Carl Malamud's public.resource.org
non-profit, and the recently announced partnership of Harvard Law School
Library and Ravel Law, appropriately termed "Free the Law."1 62 Digital
legal historians focused on the last two decades or thereabouts can also
take advantage of born-digital source repositories, such as the venerable tho-
mas.loc.gov site (making Congressional documents available since 1995),
although in many cases it is necessary to "scrape" such sites with external
tools before data can be used in bulk.' 63 But even with these important efforts
161. The peer-reviewed tutorials at The Programming Historian site are an exemplary ex-
ample of training produced by technologically minded historians for their non-technical
peers. http://programminghistorian.org (January 21, 2016).
162. "About Public.Resource.Org," 2016. https://public.resource.org/about (January 21, 2016);
Erik Eckholm, "Harvard Law Library Readies Trove of Decisions for Digital Age," New York
Times, October 29, 2015, Al5; "Harvard Law School launches 'Free the Law' Project with
Ravel Law to Digitize US Case Law, Provide Free Access," Harvard Law Today, October 29,
2015. http://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-law-school-launches-free-the-law-project-with-ravel-
law-to-digitize-us-case-law-provide-free-access/ (January 21, 2016).
163. http://thomas.loc.gov (January 21, 2016), which has now been superseded by http://
congress.gov. On scraping federal sites such as thomas.loc.gov, see Eric Mill, "A Modem
Approach to Open Data," August 20, 2013. http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/08/
20/a-modem-approach-to-open-data/ (January 21, 2016). Note, however, that although
some similar state level efforts exist, they can be more sporadic and unoven with regard
to availability and coverage.
996
Let's Change the Law 997
beginning to bear fruit, much important and useful data remain inaccessible
from a bulk-computational point of view.
This article has highlighted our use of digital computing primarily as a
discovery tool. It helped us get to Arkansas to partially answer the question
about legislative understanding that Justice Alito posed to Bryan Stevenson.
The promise of digital legal history extends far beyond the borders of a single
state and the field ofjuvenile justice. For example, scholars will ultimately be
able to use our database and digital tools to analyze any type of legislation
enacted by states during the 1990s. Our explorations in Arkansas convinced
us that legal historians should assemble more large datasets and develop
more digital tools to ask big questions that computational analysis can
help them to answer.
